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Annual military spending must reach $81.9 billion by 2032-33 to meet NATO’s spending target, new PBO report finds

Ottawa (Ontario), October 30, 2024

The Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) has released a new report assessing the fiscal sustainability of Canada’s commitment to meet NATO’s military spending target of 2% of GDP by 2032-33.

In April 2024, the government released a new defence policy, Our North Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence (ONSAF), which projected military spending to reach 1.76% of GDP by 2029-30.

The government has not released any figures showing how it plans to meet the 2% target by 2032-33. In addition, the figures released in the ONSAF forecast are based on erroneous GDP projections.

“Based on our analysis and independent GDP projections, the government’s latest military spending forecast reaches only 1.58% of GDP by 2029-30, which means military spending will have to be increased by 0.42 percentage points of GDP within the following three years to meet the target by 2032-33,” adds Mr. Giroux.

The PBO’s report evaluates a scenario where projected military expenditures under the government’s new defence policy are fully realized through the 2029-30 fiscal year and then rise to hit the 2% target by 2032-33.

"To meet Canada’s NATO spending commitment, military expenditures need to rise to $81.9 billion by 2032-33, which is nearly double the $41 billion projected for 2024-25," says Yves Giroux, PBO.

Despite the sharp increase in defence spending required to reach the NATO target of 2% of GDP, Canada’s debt-to-GDP ratio is still expected to decline, reaching 38.2% by 2032-33, just above the baseline level of 36.6%. However, the deficit-to-GDP ratio faces more pressure, exceeding 1% in the final years of the projection, driven by the additional military expenditures necessary to meet NATO’s requirement.

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    {"id":"RP-2425-020-S","is_published":"2024-10-30T12:57:09.000000Z","release_date":"2024-10-30T13:00:00.000000Z","title_en":"The Fiscal Implications of Meeting the NATO Military Spending Target","title_fr":"Les r\u00e9percussions financi\u00e8res de l\u2019atteinte de la cible de d\u00e9penses militaires fix\u00e9e par l\u2019OTAN","internal_id":"RP-2425-020-S","metadata":{"abstract_en":"This report examines the fiscal implications of Canada\u2019s recent commitment to meet NATO\u0027s military spending target of 2% of GDP by 2032.","abstract_fr":"Ce rapport examine les r\u00e9percussions financi\u00e8res de l\u2019engagement r\u00e9cent du Canada \u00e0 atteindre, d\u2019ici 2032, la cible de l\u2019OTAN consistant \u00e0 consacrer 2 % du PIB aux d\u00e9penses militaires.","highlights":[{"content":{"en":"Canada has recently committed to meeting NATO\u2019s 2% of GDP military spending target by 2032-33. According to a PBO hypothetical scenario where this target is met, defence spending would have to nearly double as compared to projections of spending for the current fiscal year (2024-25).","fr":"Le Canada s\u2019est r\u00e9cemment engag\u00e9 \u00e0 atteindre, d\u2019ici 2032-2033, la cible de l\u2019OTAN consistant \u00e0 consacrer 2 % du PIB aux d\u00e9penses militaires. Selon un sc\u00e9nario hypoth\u00e9tique du DPB o\u00f9 cette cible est atteinte, les d\u00e9penses de d\u00e9fense devraient presque doubler par rapport aux d\u00e9penses projet\u00e9es pour l\u2019exercice en cours (2024-2025)."}},{"content":{"en":"DND figures released along with its new defence policy, Our North Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada\u2019s Defence, project military spending to reach 1.76% of GDP by 2029-30, but these figures are based on an erroneous GDP forecast. Adjusting for the correct GDP growth rates, military spending only reaches 1.58% of GDP by 2029-30, leaving a 0.42 percentage point gap to meet the 2% target by 2032-33.","fr":"Les chiffres du minist\u00e8re de la D\u00e9fense (MDN), publi\u00e9s en m\u00eame temps que sa nouvelle politique de d\u00e9fense, Notre Nord, fort et libre : Une vision renouvel\u00e9e pour la d\u00e9fense du Canada, pr\u00e9voient que les d\u00e9penses militaires atteindront 1,76 % du PIB d\u2019ici 2029-2030; or, ces estimations reposent sur des pr\u00e9visions erron\u00e9es du PIB. Si l\u2019on rajuste ces pr\u00e9visions en appliquant les bons taux de croissance du PIB, les d\u00e9penses militaires n\u2019atteignent que 1,58 % du PIB en 2029-2030, ce qui laisse un \u00e9cart de 0,42 point de pourcentage \u00e0 combler pour atteindre la cible de 2 % d\u2019ici 2032-2033."}},{"content":{"en":"In the hypothetical scenario, the debt-to-GDP ratio initially remains stable before beginning a gradual decline, reaching 38.2% by 2032-33, suggesting that the government can still achieve its goal of a declining debt-to-GDP ratio despite increased military expenditures.","fr":"Dans le sc\u00e9nario hypoth\u00e9tique, le ratio de la dette au PIB reste stable dans un premier temps avant d\u2019amorcer une baisse progressive pour atteindre 38,2 % en 2032-2033, ce qui tend \u00e0 indiquer que le gouvernement peut encore atteindre son objectif de diminution du ratio de la dette au PIB malgr\u00e9 l\u2019augmentation des d\u00e9penses militaires."}},{"content":{"en":"The deficit-to-GDP ratio would be impacted more substantially over the medium term by the increased military spending, failing to reach the stated goal of 1% of GDP by 2026-27, and may exceed guidelines in the latter years of the forecast.","fr":"L\u2019augmentation des d\u00e9penses militaires aurait une incidence plus marqu\u00e9e sur le ratio du d\u00e9ficit au PIB \u00e0 moyen terme, puisque celui-ci n\u2019atteindrait pas l\u2019objectif annonc\u00e9 de 1 % du PIB d\u2019ici 2026-2027 et pourrait d\u00e9passer les lignes directrices dans les derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es de la p\u00e9riode de 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author={Penney, Christopher},\n title={The Fiscal Implications of Meeting the NATO Military Spending Target},\n institution={The Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer},\n year=2024,\n \n address = \u0022Ottawa, ON\u0022\n}","fr":"@techreport{DPB-RP2425020S,\n author={Penney, Christopher},\n title={Les r\\\u0027{e}percussions financi\\`{e}res de l\u2019atteinte de la cible de d\\\u0027{e}penses militaires fix\\\u0027{e}e par l\u2019OTAN},\n institution={Bureau du directeur parlementaire du budget},\n year=2024,\n \n address = \u0022Ottawa, ON\u0022\n}"}}